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Abstract—Community activities, such as local festivals, which
get residents to collaborate with each other, can enable them to
start interacting with others whom they have never interacted
with before. This is because festivals exist in a context that is
independent of daily jobs or hobbies of residents. This study
develops a social network model with the assumption that (i) each
player’s knowledge and experience is endogenously determined
through a network and (ii) players have various preferences
for the heterogeneity of this knowledge and experience. We
carry out numerical simulations to illustrate the dynamic process
of interaction among players. Furthermore, we investigate the
dynamic effect of exogenous link addition by festivals on network
formation and utility of each player, and evaluate the value of
festivals.
Index Terms—Social network, festival, endogenous knowledge
and experience, heterogeneous preference
I. INTRODUCTION
Through the application of the social network model,
this study analyzes the dynamic process of the interaction
between residents in a community where local “festivals”
exist. Social network models have been used to analyze the
interaction between various individuals and collective behavior.
The models are useful in analyzing “network externality”,
where a tie between two individuals affects utility of other
individuals who are either directly or indirectly connected with
one of the two. For instance, let us consider the case where
individuals A and B are connected. If individual B starts to
interact with individual C, then individual A is more likely
to make a tie with individual C. This is because the common
friend B has the potential of introducing A to C. Using this
kind of “network externality” as a key concept, much of the
research has discussed many kinds of phenomena such as
the information ﬂow and the coordinated actions under the
framework of network models thus far (e.g. [1] - [4]).
This study analyzes the dynamics of the network externality
generated by local “festivals”. In the domain of sociological
studies, it has been revealed that unlike day-to-day life, special
occasions inﬂuence individual’s psychological process and
social integration (e.g. [5] - [7]). Therefore, in dealing with
connections among residents in a community, local “festivals”
should be taken into consideration as representation of ex-
ceptional times. In general, festivals provide an opportunity
for people to meet and cooperate with others with distinct
occupations, ages, nationalities, and so on. Through these
opportunities, even in day-to-day life, some people start to
interact with others who would they have never met otherwise.
In other words, this study assumes that festivals provide people
with the opportunity to make unintentional connections even
in ordinary situations.
In light of the role of festivals, how do festivals affect
network structure and utility derived from such networks?
What is the value of festivals in terms of social network
formation? To answer these critical research questions, we
develop a model on network formation in a community with
festivals, and then, through numerical simulations, we analyze
the dynamics of the network characteristics and utility.
Much of the previous literature on network formation is
mainly under three assumptions: 1) exogenous types or char-
acteristics, 2) homophily, and 3) the network formation based
on the notion of improving paths.
For example, Johnson and Gilles [8], Droste et al. [9], and
Iijima and Kamada [10] deal with network formation based
on homophily, the socio-psychological tendency of people to
interact with others similar to oneself (e.g. [11] - [12]). In these
network studies, it is assumed that types or characteristics,
which are given exogenously to each player, determine (social)
distance between players. A pair of the players with a smaller
social distance pays less cost or obtains more beneﬁt of
maintaining the link. Under these assumptions, the process of
integration of a community, for example, how and why people
with similar race tend to live close, has been discussed.
In addition, many social network models consider the
improving path as the basis for the network formation based
on the rational player [13]. In these models, player i and j
add the link ij if the two players involved both agree to its
addition, with at least one of the two strictly beneﬁting from
the addition of the link. Meanwhile, the two delete the link if
at least one of two players involved in the link strictly beneﬁts
from its deletion. So, the formation of a link requires the
consent of both players, but severance can be done unilaterally.
This individual optimization process leads to networks called
pairwise stable networks.
On the contrary, our model revises the above three as-
sumptions. We consider that 1) players have the knowledge
and experience that are determined endogenously through
network and moreover these endogenous variables determine
the “homogeneity” and “heterogeneity” between players. We
also note that 2) each player has a preference not only
for the homogeneity but also for the heterogeneity of the
endogenous knowledge and experience and that 3) festivals
create opportunities to add a link independently of player’s
evaluation based on utility function in their day-to-day life.
1) This study focuses on endogenously determined knowl-
edge and experience of players rather than exogenously de-
termined types or characteristics. This is because we suppose
that whether or not to maintain connections would essentially
depend on not just exogenous types or characteristics of
other players, but their endogenously determined knowledge
and experience. We also assume that this knowledge and
experience can be created through their interaction with others.
In fact, people can learn and obtain new knowledge and
experience from others who they meet. Under this assumption,
both “homogeneity” and “heterogeneity” of knowledge and
experience between players are also determined endogenously
through the network.
2) This study considers “heterophily”, while much literature
on network formation focuses on “homophily”. Essentially,
from a viewpoint of exchange of knowledge and experience,
some prefer to associate with similar people; others prefer
to associate with diverse others. We focus on a community
where players who prefer homogeneity and players who prefer
heterogeneity coexist; that is, two types of preferences for
knowledge and experience coexist. Then we analyze how
players with various preferences create networks. Needless to
say, there are several papers that focus on heterophily (e.g.
Currarini et al. [14] and Fu et al. [15]). However, these papers
do no more than assume the existence of just heterophilous
players or focus on preference for heterogeneity of exogenous
types or characteristics.
Finally, 3) this study focuses on the exceptional times pro-
duced by festivals. As previously mentioned, festivals provide
the opportunity for people to interact with others who they
would have never met otherwise. Our model assumes that
festivals create links that would not necessarily be created
under utility function in day-to-day life. In other words, we
interpret festivals as events that add a link without mutual
consent under utility function in day-to-day life, and then add
this link formation that festivals generate as exogenous shock
to the dynamics based on the improving path. We analyze
how such festivals affect the dynamic process of one-to-one
link formation in a community. Undoubtedly, many aspects of
festivals have been studied in the ﬁeld of social network theory.
However, we do not know of any studies that model the link
formation in exceptional times of festivals as mentioned above
and analyze its dynamic effect on formation of social networks.
In contrast, this study constructs the social network model with
a focus on the three aforementioned features.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In
Section 2 we present the model of stochastic dynamics of
network formation. In Section 3 we analyze network formation
without festivals by means of numerical simulations. In Section
4 we extend the model to include festivals and analyze the
dynamic effect of link addition by festivals. Finally, Section 5
concludes and describes future work.
II. SOCIAL NETWORK FORMATION CONSIDERING
PREFERENCES FOR HOMOGENEITY AND HETEROGENEITY
OF KNOWLEDGE AND EXPERIENCE
A. The Model
Let N = {1, · · · , n} be the ﬁnite set of players (n > 2).
The network relations among the players are represented by
graphs whose nodes represent the players and whose links
capture the connections between the players. A network g is
a set of links between players in N . ij represents the link
connecting players i and j. If ij ∈ g, then players i and j are
directly connected in the network g, while if ij /∈ g, then
players are not directly connected. For instance, if n = 3
and there are directed links between players 1 and 2 and
players 2 and 3, the network is written as g = {12, 23}.
Player i’s neighbors are j ∈ N with ij ∈ g. Formally, the
set of i’s neighbors in g, denoted by Ni(g), is deﬁned as
Ni(g) = {j ∈ N |ij ∈ g}. Player i’s degree is the number
of i’s neighbors, which is deﬁned as di(g) = |Ni(g)|.
Each player is assumed to have knowledge and experience
that are endogenously determined through her/his neighbors.
Thus, how similar, in other words, how “homogeneous” player
j’s knowledge and experience are for player i would heavily
depend on how many neighbors the players share. Meanwhile,
how different, in other words, how “heterogeneous” player
j’s knowledge and experience are for player i would heavily
depend on how many j’s neighbors are not i’s neighbors. We
assume that the more (less) neighbors player i shares with
player j, the more homogeneous (heterogeneous) the pair is.
This assumption seems to be natural because it is more likely
that if i shares more (less) neighbors with j, then i gains
similar (different) knowledge and experience with (from) j
through her/his neighbors.
Hence, in terms of knowledge and experience, we call
the part in which players i and j resemble as “homogeneity
Sij”, while we call the part in which players i and j vary
as “heterogeneity Dij”, which we represent respectively as
follows:
Sij = |Ni(g) ∩Nj(g)|, (1)
Dij = |Nj(g) \ (Ni(g) ∪ {i}) |. (2)
Sij is deﬁned as the number of elements of the intersection
of the sets of neighbors of i and j, while Dij is deﬁned as
the number of elements of the complement of the set of i’s
neighbors relative to the set of j’s neighbors.
We will consider preferences for homogeneity and hetero-
geneity. Let xi ∈ {0, 1} be a parameter that represents each
player’s preference for heterogeneity. If a player has xi = 0,
then the player has a preference for homogeneity Sij . If a
player has xi = 1, then the player has a preference for
heterogeneity Dij . In what follows, we call the former players
as “homophilous” and the latter players as “heterophilous”.
Assuming that each player beneﬁts from her/his neighbors’
homogeneity and heterogeneity and the number of her/his





b(xi, Dij , Sij)
⎞
⎠− c(di) · di, (3)
where b(·) in the ﬁrst term represents the beneﬁt that i obtains
from a link with j, and c(di) in the second term represents
the cost for i of maintaining a link. In general, the larger the
number of i’s neighbors is, the more the schedule adjustment
and the opportunity cost seem to increase for i, so c(di) is
assumed to be non-decreasing function, that is, dc(di)ddi ≥ 0.
B. The Dynamic Process
n players play a game repeatedly. Let gt denote the network
at the beginning of period t (≥ 1). In an arbitrary period t,
given gt, players decide to add or delete links.
Our dynamic process of link formation belongs to the
stochastic dynamic process, which has been widely used
in many papers (e.g., Jackson and Watts [13], [16]). The
stochastic dynamic process is based on the notion of improving
path accompanied with exogenous randomness. This means
that the process is subject to evolutionary pressure, namely,
bounded rationality: the inertia, myopic and error/mutation
hypothesis. In the situation we consider i) not all players
need to react instantaneously to their environment (the inertia
hypothesis), ii) when players react, they react myopically (the
myopic hypothesis), and iii) there is a small probability that
players change their strategies at random (the error/mutation
hypothesis). For example, without any error/mutation, one of
equilibrium is locked in at random by externality, whereas
under the stochastic process, the network continues to change
indeﬁnitely and to visit each network over time, so in the
long run the process identiﬁes the most robust or easy-to-reach
networks.
The dynamic process in period t consists of the following
4 steps, proposed by Jackson and Watts [13].
1st
A pair of players ij is randomly identiﬁed with ﬁxed
probability distribution {pij} (pij > 0).
2nd
The rest of the players (i.e. players except the pair ij)
does not react instantaneously to their environment,
in other words, does not adjust their links (the inertia
hypothesis).
3rd
The pair ij, identiﬁed in the 1st step, myopically
decides whether to add or delete the link ij, fol-
lowing the rule which is shown below (the myopia
hypothesis). They make this choice based on the
assumption that players (including themselves) will
have the same links (except the link ij) as at the
beginning of this period.
3-1 In case that the link ij is not in the network
gt, it is added if at least one player’s utility
increases and the other player’s does not
decrease. Otherwise, it is not added.
3-2 In case that the link ij is already in the
network gt, it is deleted if either player
would beneﬁt from its removal. Otherwise,
it is kept being connected.
4th
After the choice is made, there is some small proba-
bility  (0 <  < 1) that an error/mutation occurs (the
error/mutation hypothesis). Hence, the choice is not
reversed with probability 1 −  and is reversed with
probability . This process determines the network




• In case ij /∈ gt
If ui(gt + ij) ≥ ui(gt) and uj(gt + ij) ≥ uj(gt)
with one inequality strict, then gt1 = g
t + ij with
probability (1−) and gt with . Otherwise, gt1 =
gt with probability (1− ) and gt + ij with .
• In case ij ∈ gt
If ui(gt − ij) > ui(gt) and/or uj(gt − ij) >
uj(gt), then gt1 = g
t − ij with probability
(1 − ) and gt with probability . Otherwise,
gt1 = g
t with probability (1 − ) and gt − ij
with probability .
The network gt1 that is determined through the above process
is the network at the end of period t. This network is also the
network at the beginning of period t + 1. After period t + 1,
the above process is repeated.
Note that in the 3rd step you can see the asymmetry of
adding and deleting a link. This represents that the formation
of a link requires the consent of both players, but severance
can be done unilaterally.
III. NUMERICAL SIMULATION
A. Functions and Parameters
In this section we consider the case without festivals as
a basic model. Then, we examine the dynamics of each
homophilous and heterophilous player’s degree, the number
of homophilous and heterophilous players in the degree, and
her/his net utility obtained from the links by means of numer-
ical simulation.
We specify the functions and parameters as follows:
b(xi, Sij , Dij) = xiDij + (1− xi)Sij , (4)





) , g1 = ∅, (6)
n = 20, t = 3000, c¯ = 0.1, (7)
 = 0.025. (8)
































Fig. 1. One homophilous player’s degree






































Fig. 2. One heterophilous player’s degree









































Fig. 3. One homophilous player’s net utility obtained
from her/his links








































Fig. 4. One heterophilous player’s net utility ob-
tained from her/his links





































Fig. 5. The number of links that one heterophilous
player has with homophilous players





































Fig. 6. The number of links that one heterophilous
player has with heterophilous players
The beneﬁt b(xi, Sij , Dij), which i obtains from a link with
j, is a linear function where homogeneity Sij is weighted with
1− xi and heterogeneity Dij is weighted with xi.
The cost c(di), which represents the cost for a player of
maintaining a link, remains constant regardless of the increase
of the number of i’s neighbors. Under c¯ = 0.1, homophilous
player i beneﬁts from adding a link with player j sharing at
least one same neighbor, while heterophilous player i beneﬁts
from adding a link with player j having at least one neighbor
who is not i’s neighbor.
The ﬁxed probability pij for the 1st step in the dynamic
process is uniformly distributed. The initial network g1 is the
empty network.
In the analysis, let us examine the following 5 cases,
whose proportion of homophilous and heterophilous players
is different. The ﬁve different cases would let us deeply
understand how various players interact with each other.
case1
25% (i = 1, · · · , 5) homophilous players, and
75% (i = 6, · · · , 20) heterophilous players.
case2
40% (i = 1, · · · , 8) homophilous players, and
60% (i = 9, · · · , 20) heterophilous players.
case3
50% (i = 1, · · · , 10) homophilous players, and
50% (i = 10, · · · , 20) heterophilous players.
case4
60% (i = 1, · · · , 12) homophilous players, and
40% (i = 13, · · · , 20) heterophilous players.
case5
75% (i = 1, · · · , 15) homophilous players, and
25% (i = 16, · · · , 20) heterophilous players.
We run a Monte Carlo simulation with 1,000 iterations for
each case, and examine its mean in the analysis.
B. Results
Simulations result show that each homophilous and het-
erophilous player’s degree and their utility increase as time
goes on (Fig. 1-4).
Let us consider cases 1-5, dividing the time into “an early
stage”, where links are connected mainly by error/mutation,
and “a later stage”, where links are connected on the basis of
an early stage. In what follows, for simplifying the notation, we
express a link between homophilous players as “homo-homo”,
a link between heterophilous players as “hetero-hetero”, and a
link between a homophilous player and a heterophilous player
as “homo-hetero (or hetero-homo)”.
First of all, let us consider case 3 as a case of reference,
where homophilous players and heterophilous players equally
exist. In Fig. 1-6, 14, and 15, case 3 is expressed by green
line.
If we look at Fig. 5, 6, and 15, we can see that the number
Fig. 7. The condition where ho-
mophilous players i and j add a link
ij
Fig. 8. The condition where het-
erophilous players i and j add a link
ij
of hetero-hetero links (Fig. 6) is highly increased in an early
stage. Then, following it, the number of homo-homo links (Fig.
14) gets increased. After homo-homo links, the number of
homo-hetero links (Fig. 5) grows. Thus, it is the basic pattern
that the links get connected in order of 1) hetero-hetero, 2)
homo-homo, 3) homo-hetero. The reason of this pattern is
shown below.
Now, in the case where players i and j are not
connected (ij /∈ g), forming link ij by both players’ rational
choices requires one of the conditions depicted in the Fig.
7 and 8. In the ﬁgures, white nodes express homophilous
players, while black nodes express heterophilous players. Dark
nodes can be either of homophilous and heterophilous players.
When players i and j are homophilous (Fig. 7), in order to be
connected, they must already have common neighbor k, which
means that Sij = Sji ≥ 1 should be satisﬁed for forming the
link ij. Meanwhile, When players i and j are heterophilous
(Fig. 8), in order to be connected it is required that for player
i adding a link with j should bring new knowledge from l and
also that for the player j forming the link with j should bring
new knowledge from k. This means that both Dij ≥ 1 and
Dji ≥ 1 should be satisﬁed for forming the link ij.
To reach these conditions from the empty network, at least
two error/mutation are required for making links such as link
ik and jk in Fig. 7 and link ik and jl in Fig. 8. In terms of
probability, the latter network g = {ik, jl} is more likely to
be created, since l( = k) is allowed to be any player. Thus, in
an early stage of dynamic process hetero-hetero links are more
likely to be connected, and subsequently homo-homo links are
formed.
Next, let us look at link formation between players with
distinct preferences. The case where heterophilous player i
and homophilous player j make link ij by rational choice for
the ﬁrst time should simultaneously satisfy the following two
conditions.
Condition 1
For a heterophilous player i, player j already main-
tains a link with k who is not i’s neighbor.
Condition 2
For a homophilous player j, player i already main-
tains a link with l who is also j’s neighbor.
The situation where both condition 1 and 2 are simulta-
neously satisﬁed depends on whether each player k and l
is homophilous or heterophilous. Let us call each situation
“situation A”, “situation B”, “situation C” and “situation D”,
respectively, as depicted in Fig. 9-12. In Fig. 9-12 white nodes
are homophilous players and black nodes are heterophilous
players.
Here, let us assume the case where a homo-hetero link is
formed for the ﬁrst time by rational decision making. This
assumption requires that homo-hetero links in situations A-
D have already been made by error/mutation. Situations C
and D has two homo-hetero links respectively, so whether
situations C and D exist heavily depends on the probability
of error/mutation. In other words, the situation where homo-
hetero links are likely to be added by error/mutation is the
situation where homo-hetero links grow faster. Additionally,
with regard to homo-homo links, situation A has two homo-
homo links, each situation B-D has one link, so maintaining
homo-homo links is also much inﬂuential in forming link ij.
Hence, case 3 has the following structure where homo-homo
links, hetero-hetero links and homo-hetero links are connected.
• In an early stage
Hetero-hetero links grow faster from the empty network
because the situation as depicted in Fig. 8 is likely to
appear. Subsequently, homo-homo links get formed.
• In a later stage
Since homo-homo links already exist, situations A-D are
likely to appear, which leads homo-hetero links to be
connected.
On the basis of case 3, let us consider cases 1 and 2 where
the proportion of homophilous players is small. In Fig. 1-6, 14,
and 15, case 1 is expressed by red line and case 2 by orange
line.
• In an early stage
The proportion of heterophilous players is so large that
heterophilous players are more likely to have links formed
by error/mutation. Thus, the situations depicted in Fig.
8 are more likely to exist, so hetero-hetero links highly
increase in an early stage. This leads a heterophilous
player’s degree to reach a higher level. For this reason, the
red and orange lines remain at a higher level until around
t = 2000 in Fig. 2. As shown in Fig. 7, homo-homo
links are essentially difﬁcult to be formed, and moreover
the proportion of homophilous players is so small that
homophilous players are less likely to have links formed
by error/mutation. For this reason, homo-homo links have
not been added so much across time.
• In a later stage
The number of homo-homo links, which affect so much
homo-hetero link formation, is small, but the number of
hetero-hetero links is so large that situations B and D
is more likely to appear. Thus, homo-hetero links grow
gradually.
Finally, let us consider cases 4 and 5 where the proportion
of homophilous players is large. In Fig. 1-6, 14, and 15, case
4 is expressed by blue line and case 5 is expressed by black
line.
Fig. 9. Situation A Fig. 10. Situation B Fig. 11. Situation C Fig. 12. Situation D
Fig. 13. The process of the increase in one heterophilous player’s degree
• In an early stage
The proportion of homophilous players is so large that
homophilous players are more likely to have links formed
by error/mutation. Thus, the situation depicted in Fig. 7 is
more likely to exist, so homo-homo links highly increase
in an early stage. On the other hand, the proportion
of heterophilous players is so small that the situation
depicted in Fig. 8 is less likely to appear. For this reason,
hetero-hetero links have not been added so much across
time.
• In a later stage
The number of homo-homo is large, so situation A is the
most likely to exist and subsequently situations B and C
are more likely to exist. Thus, homo-hetero links grow
largely. As homo-hetero links grow, because of the small
proportion of heterophilous players, the number of hetero-
homo links that one heterophilous player has increases.
Furthermore, let us look at the case after hetero-homo
link ij is added in situation A (the leftmost in Fig. 13).
This stage already has a lot of homo-homo links, so it is
likely that homophilous player k and homophilous player
m are connected. Thus, we see the same situation with
A (the second from the left in Fig. 13), so players i and
k add link ik by their rational choice (the third from the
left in Fig. 13). Then, player m is likely to have other
homo-homo links, and again we see the same situation
with A (the fourth from the left in Fig. 13), which can
lead players i and m to be connected (the ﬁfth from the
left in Fig. 13); repeating this process gets heterophilous
player i’s degree increased. For this reason, the blue and
black lines appear at a higher level since around t = 2000
in Fig. 2.
IV. ROLE OF FESTIVALS
A. Network Formation with Festivals
This section considers a community with festivals. Festivals
seem to exist in a context independent of daily jobs or hobbies
of residents, so the way of adding links through festivals seems
to be different from that dependent on utility function already
formulated.
Thus, after the 1st - 4th steps of dynamic process shown in
the previous section we add the following 5th step, in which
festivals allow players to be connected at random without
mutual consent.
5th
If the link ij is not in the network, then the link ij
is added at random without mutual consent. In other
words, if the link ij is not in the network gt1, then
it is added with probability η (0 < η < 1) while
it is not added with probability 1 − η. Additionally,
when the link ij is added, if there are no links except
ij, remove link ij, otherwise, remove another link
kl randomly identiﬁed. The above process generates
network gt2.
To be more speciﬁc, the network gt2 is obtained as
follow:
• If ij /∈ gt1, then gt2 = gt1+ij−kl (, where if gt1 =
∅, kl = ij, otherwise kl = ij) with probability
η, and gt2 = g
t
1 with (1−η). Otherwise, gt2 = gt1.
The network gt2 that is determined through the above
process is the network at the end of period t. This network
is also the network at the beginning of period t + 1. After
period t + 1, the above process is repeated.
Note that the reason why we delete link kl ∈ gt1 as well
as add link ij is as follows: Adding one link in the 5th step
without deletion obviously increases the number of links in
networks. We need to avoid this obvious result because our
aim is to investigate the true long run effect of adding a link
in the 5th step on network formation. So we remove link kl.
In numerical simulation, we specify the probability of
adding a link through festivals as η = 0.05, and use same
functions and parameters in the previous section.




































Fig. 14. The number of links that one homophilous
player has with homophilous players






































Fig. 15. The number of links that one homophilous
player has with heterophilous players





































Fig. 16. One homophilous player’s degree in a
community with festivals







































Fig. 17. One heterophilous player’s degree in a
community with festivals




































Fig. 18. One homophilous player’s net utility
obtained from her/his links in a community with
festivals








































Fig. 19. One heterophilous player’s net utility
obtained from her/his links in a community with
festivals
B. Results
Given that festivals exist, the 5th step forms a link inde-
pendently of a pair’s utility of day-to-day life and then deletes
another link. Here, the series of the process does not change
the number of links in a network, so we cannot see the growth
of a network within the period. However, comparing Fig. 1-4
with Fig. 16-19 respectively, we can observe the increase in
degree of each homophilous player and heterophilous player
in every case when festivals exist, which means networks
grow in the long run with the presence of festivals. We
can also observe the long-term increase in each homophilous
player’s and heterophilous player’s net utility. This tendency is
remarkable especially in cases 1 and 2, where the proportion
of homophilous players is small.
Let us consider the reason of the above phenomena. In the
case without festivals, link ik and jk in Fig. 7, link ik and jl
in Fig. 8, and homo-hetero links in Fig. 9-12 are never added
with mutual consent under utility function in day-to-day life
but are added only by error/mutation. However, in the case with
festivals, festivals create a link regardless of utility function in
day-to-day life, and consequently, link ij in Fig. 7-12 is more
likely to be added with mutual consent under utility function
in day-to-day life.
Once these links are formed, other links become connected
with mutual consent, as is shown before in Fig. 13. Mean-
while, new links always generate the positive externality on
homophilous players, so more and more homo-homo links are
also added with mutual consent. When festivals do not exist,
networks in cases 1 and 2 have fewer links, so the above effect
of link addition would be much greater.
In summary, in terms of network formation, it is the value
of festivals that forms high potential links which produce a
negative effect on utility of day-to-day life in the short term
but accelerate autonomous network formation and generate a
large amount of utility in the long term.
V. CONCLUSION
This study formulated a stochastic dynamics of link forma-
tion based on the notion of improving paths in a community,
assuming that 1) both “homogeneity” and “heterogeneity” of
others’ knowledge and experience are endogenously deter-
mined, and 2) the players have a variety of preferences. We
considered that the role of festivals is to allow players to add
links randomly regardless of their utility of day-to-day life, and
then we investigated the change of network dynamics with and
without festivals by means of numerical simulation.
When no festivals exist, we found that links between
players with different preferences were the least likely to
appear. However, when festivals exist, we found that even
if festivals add links with negative utility in the short run
between players with different preferences, these links can
be triggers that accelerate autonomous network formation not
only between heterophilous and homophilous players but also
between homophilous players. These links can also produce a
large amount of utility in the long run. In terms of network
formation, we can emphasize that to add these kinds of links
is the value of festivals.
Interesting topics for future works are as follows. Firstly, the
model should be extended to take into account endogenously
determined preferences of players, while our current model
assumes the exogenous preference. Residents’ preferences
seem to depend largely on their position in networks or
experience of festivals. Secondly, the model, which currently
formulates festivals in the form of one-to-one meetings, should
also include simultaneous link formation because festivals are
implemented by the collective actions of many people.
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